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THE LEVELING of MEANING:
CHRISTIAN ETHICS in A CULTURE
OF UNCONCERN
Philip Rossi, SJ

hristian practices and beliefs - and, quite probably, the practices and
beliefs of most religious traditions - have generally presupposed a
deeply rooted human need to have one's own life and the context of one's
life make sense in a definitive way. If one accords this quest to find a "final
meaning" for human activity a fundamental status in the make-up of
human beings, religion functions as an important activity for the
satisfaction of this basic human need. Indeed, religion may even be
understood to be nothing other than human engagement in such a quest
for final meaning. I According to this view, meaninglessness, and its
concomitant, despair, would eventually loom before persons and
communities lacking a framework of such implicitly religious "final"
meaning.
Yet what if it were possible for persons to live in ways that are - at least
apparently - humanly satisfying, but without a framework of definitive
(Le. religious) meaning? Suppose that the human quest for meaning could
be satisfied by a series of discrete, partial episodes of making sense which
need not add up to a final, comprehensive framework - or suppose, even
more radically, that one - or one's culture - came to accept that the quest
for final meaning need not be satisfied at all. Suppose most people
considered it not at all problematic to hold that life mostly consists - to
use a colloquial expression - of "one damn thing after another" and that
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few, if any, felt that there was any urgency to make of it anything more
than that. 2
Against the background of these seemingly speculative questions, this
essay advances for discussion the hypothesis that a set of dynamics for
living without a framework for final meaning is, in fact, already operative
at a number of levels (theoretical, practical, popular) in the emerging
cultures of informational, economic, and technological globalization.
These dynamics are unlike those forms of nihilism and atheism that,
because they presume the validity or the significance of a human quest for
final meaning, are paradigmatically "modern" in their theoretical and
practical articulations. Modern nihilism and atheism, like the forms of
belief they contest, take final human meanings to adumbrate connections
that are more than merely accidental and discontinuities that are not
simply random. They are matter!i., enduringly inscribed in the human
condition which mark out its depth - even if that depth consists only in
the recognition of all meaning as a fragile human construct that is
irrevocably shattered at one's death.
In contrast, at least some of the dynamics present in emergent forms of
so-called "postmodern" global culture work from a quite different
presupposition: meaning is not and can never be final; it is only and
always a matter of immediacy, contingency and "surface" - the
connections that constitute meaning are merely transient "links that one
just as easily clicks on as clicks off. Since every meaning is evanescent, any
meaning will do. One need not regret abandoning one form of meaning
for another, or for yet another after that. Meanings have only limited,
contingent usefulness, and so are disposable once their usefulness for the
moment has run its course.
These dynamics, so the hypothesis runs, offer precisely the possibility
of setting aside, without (much) regret, a quest for a life meaning that is
unifying and comprehensive, while still finding life satisfaction precisely in
whatever transient meaning can be constructed in and from the interrupted
and interrupting interplay of life's particularity and contingency. This
possibility is not altogether novel. A case can be made that this view was
prefigured, in a much earlier age, by the Democritian atomism of
Epicureanism, and that, more recently, David Hume eloquently proposed
a similar view: an effective cure for the temptation to embark on a quest
for final meaning - at least of the kind represented by metaphysical
reasoning - is to find some pleasant social diversion that does not purport
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to exhibit itself as something deeper. Such clear-headed recognition of the
absence of final meaning need not lead - as it did for the existentialists of
the middle third of the twentieth century - to defiance or despair in the
face of a cosmos ultimately indifferent to the fate of any of its particular
components. This recognition simply allows one to get on with making
one's way through the partialities and contingencies of one's own life with
an equanimity that comes from putting aside as pointless bother any quest
for a deeper or final meaning in it.
These dynamics can be appropriately called "the leveling of meaning."
They arise, I believe, from the convergence of a variety of vectors upon the
conditions of human living at the beginning of this new century. Some of
these vectors take an economic form that seems driven by a momentum
fueled by late twentieth-century global capitalism's dismantlement of its
Marxist rival. In this context, the measure of "meaning" is economic loss
and gain. As a function of market share, the bottom line, and the
maximization of profit, this form of meaning has a far wider field than
ever before over which to playas well as many more ways in which to play.
Instantaneous transfer throughout a global network of markets has made
it possible to catch, at anytime of day or night, just the right movement up or down - to better one's placement for yet more gain.3
Other vectors take a technological form, driven by the exponentially
growing possibilities for accessing and organizing information and for
global communicative interconnection. In this context, even as meaning
accrues in the assemblage of information and through the pathways of its
transmission, it is potentially subject at each juncture of its path to
re-assemblage and reconfiguration. Meaning arises as a function of coding
and decoding, and power resides in mastery of the code. 4
Still other vectors take social and political forms that variously devolve
governing power from the center into more localized bodies or demand
due recognition of the practices that mark and sustain the particularity of
linguistic, religious, or ethnic identity. Yet even as the forms of political
power seem to be edging back to the local and particular, the shaping of
the terms of the political discourse giving concrete meaning to the exercise
of that power remain entrenched in dynamics that seem systemically to
circumvent the possibility of accountability to any genuinely public realm,
be it local, national, regional, or global. Political meaning - most notably,
but not only, in electoral politics - comes to reside in how policy and
personality can be packaged for this particular electorate at this particular

164

ETHICS AND RELIGION IN THE W EST

time. The temporal horizon for the endurance of political meaning
stretches only as far as the next campaign.
Embedded in these vectors (and others that I believe can be identified
within the interplay of forces shaping our contemporary world) - so my
hypothesis continues - is an implicit account of, if I may modify a phrase
appropriated from Charles Taylor, "the making of a postmodern identity."s
This account, which arises from the context of what Taylor has termed the
"fractured horizons" of meaning that are the inheritance of modernity,
poses a serious and perhaps even radically new challenge to religious belief
and practice - most certainly to those forms that have arisen from the
traditions that stretch back to Abraham but perhaps to all that construe
our human identity, be it individual or collective, to be in some core sense
"spiri tual."
The challenge that this account presents is not simply that it is a
reductive naturalism, i.e. the view that there is no spiritual ingredient in
what it takes to constitute an individual as (a) human (person). The
challenge is, rather, that it is a naturalism so seamlessly woven into the
fabric of daily practice that this absence of a spiritual component in our
human make-up is unsurprising. It is taken as a matter of course that
human life is solely a matter of contingent particularity that need not add
up, individually or collectively, to all that much. Whereas "modern"
challenges to religious belief and practice more typically.took form as an
articulated theoretical denial or indignant protest (be it social or personal)
in the face of claims made on behalf of transcendence, the "postmodern"
challenge is far more likely to be, in practice, an expression of puzzlement
or a shrug of indifference.
This shrug is directed not so much at the content of the claims of
belief, but at the very possibility that belief in God - or its denial - is a
matter of importance in the business of negotiating one's way through
life. As Taylor has succinctly put it, "The threat at the margin of modern
non-theistic humanism is: So what?"6 The shrug of indifference,
moreover, is no longer about what may be claimed about God; it is
about what we may claim about our own humanity. If it is the case - and
I think it is, though the point is arguable - that "modernity" has taught us
that we can talk about ourselves and about the world without having to
talk about God, then what "postmodernity" in some of its practical forms
may be teaching us is to talk about ourselves without having to talk about
ourselves as spirit.
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I think it important for keeping discussion of my hypothesis on track
that I point out that it is not principally concerned with the intellectual
articulations that so-called "postmodernism" has given to matters such as
particularity, contingency, interruptions and otherness. It is even less
concerned with urging a program for a countervailing intellectual
refutation of claims that are made in a postmodernist mode about these
matters. I would, in fact, be willing to argue that such postmodernist
articulations are particularly valuable precisely because they draw our
attention to an emergent dynamic within our human circumstances which
it would be perilous to ignore.
My main concern in articulating this hypothesis is that we attend to
how our imaginative and conceptual construal of what it is to be human is
affected by practices that are woven into an emergent global culture and
affect our daily lives. These practices, on the one hand, enable and
encourage us to construe the content of our human satisfactions more
and more in terms of the immediacy that arises from the interplay of
contingent succession; yet, on the other hand, they also promise us the
possibility of having increasing individual control over that interplay. They
place us on the brink of beginning to believe that within our hands will
soon be nothing less than the possibility of us each achieving our own
individual "designer" satisfaction.
I think that what is at issue here can be put in terms of a narrative that,
even as it goes back to the formative period of Western philosophy,
maintains considerable power as a diagnostic tool for our own
circumstances: the myth of the cave told by Plato in the Republic. A
contemporary retelling of this myth would, I believe, have to acknowledge
that the shadows that play upon the wall of the cave have grown in the
power they have to captivate human imagination. They have grown in
power because we now seem to have gained a capacity to make them
almost (shall I use the mantra "virtually"?) indistinguishable from that of
which they are shadows. They have also grown in their power because we
have willingly been enlisted in their making by the lure that we can make
them whatever we want them to be. Unlike in Plato's version of the myth,
we need not be chained before the shadow show to keep us engaged in it we readily stay in the cave, each taking our turn now as shadow-maker,
now as shadow-watcher. There is no "outside" beyond the cave to make it
manifest that the shadow show is no more than that. Insofar as we have
come to believe that the shadow show is sufficient, that we need no
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outside against which to measure it, such an "outside" has become quite
unimaginable - and it is not even all that much of a bother to tune out the
occasional noisy chatter of the few odd folks who claim there is.
Perhaps this is all too harsh, especially in light of the fact that other
vectors are at work within the dynamics fueling an emerging culture of
globalization which make it possible for us to discern more fully the level
of enduring human meaning that religious belief and practice have
articulated as the locus for the presence and operation of spirit. At its best,
the culture of globalization should make possible a more effective concrete
recognition of our human interdependence and commonality, even as it
allows greater room for expression and recognition of the particularity
that makes each human being and set of human circumstances unique. It
would be genuinely exhilarating to see processes of globalization
deepening and enlarging the range for our discerning the presence of
the spiritual at the core of human existence by making it possible for us to
affirm both the enduring strength of our human connectedness and the
uniqueness of the rich variety of our human differences.
Yet it is also the case that the human knowledge and skills that make it
possible for us to enlarge the complexity and the scope of our
connectedness with one another have also made it possible for us to level
our connectedness down to the linear simplicity of the discrete moments
of transactional encounter and exchange in a marketplace that now is
global. Our imaginative construal of the content of what connects us
begins to be modelled on the means that now so easily enable us to make
so many connections with one another: encoded packets of instantly
transmittable information. Similarly, the knowledge and skills that make
possible an articulation of difference as difference in ways that are
potentially richer than any that were available in previous eras have also
made it possible for us to level any difference down to the contingent
coalescence of particularity that wins its meaning not as difference but as
effective power against any other congeries of particularity that we
perceive as posing a threat to our own particularity.
This duality of possibilities suggests to me that in order to make actual
those that a culture of globalization offers for enlarging the realm of spirit,
we also need to identify and engage the perilous counter-possibilities of
our seriously contracting it. It is important that we recognize the ways that
we might very well become willing accomplices to the self-stifling of spirit,
a possibility that Charles Taylor has aptly likened to performing "spiritual
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lobotomy" upon ourselves? How might we prevent that from happening?
At this point, I really do not know - and my own perplexity in the face
of the possibility that we may be facing the emergence of a culture of
unconcern is precisely what has moved me to propose the hypothesis
of this chapter for discussion.
If my hypothesis is correct, then an 'appropriate response on the part of
communities of religious belief seems likely to require significant
reshaping of both thought and practice in a variety of ways in order to
address effectively the challenge presented by an environing culture that
levels out all meaning. Just as I am quite sure that there is no one way, no
single strategy that communities of religious believers can adopt to deal
with these dynamics, I am equally sure that the wrong general strategy
would be simply to seek some form of insulation from them - even though
there may be circumstances in which creative strategies of protest and
resistance may well be fitting. Far more appropriate, I believe, will be
strategies that engage these dynamics in such a way as to enable them to
become open from within to the possibility that the reality of spirit is so
deeply embedded in the human that it simply cannot be stifled - no matter
how hard we try.
Let me therefore propose the outline of one strategy for discerning and
engaging the reality of spirit within the larger cultural dynamics shaping us
at the start of the twenty-first century. This strategy emerges from a
resource upon which the three forms of the reflective appropriation of
experience that have long shaped my work in philosophical and
theological ethics have regularly converged: the capacity for exercising
imagination as a critical power for the discernment of what is most deeply
human. 8 In proposing imagination as an appropriate resource for
countering the leveling of meaning in which the practices of contemporary
culture can make us complicit, I am understanding imagination as more
than merely "fictive."9 Imagination is not the mere play of make-believe, a
capacity for making up that which will never become actual. Imagination as it is exercised, for instance, in the oracles of the Hebrew prophets, in the
parables of Jesus, or in nonviolent resistance to injustice as practiced by
Martin Luther King, Jr. - is rather a capacity to make manifest the deepest
inner possibilities that can be made actual as well as to unmask the
illusions that constrain us from acting on those possibilities. lO
In particular, the exercise of imagination that I think will be most
needed throughout the century that has just begun is precisely that which
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makes manifest to us that our own deepest inner possibilities as human are
thoroughly spiritual. Imagination must be brought to bear to counter one
of the losses that Charles Taylor thinks has taken place in forging the
modern self - viz. an increasing inability to articulate our human identity
as moral or spiritual in any but a private sense. Such a private construal of
our identity as spirit almost inevitably proves too fragile to bear the weight
of the quite public moral responsibility for one another in human
solidarity, sympathy, and equality which, even in their naturalistic forms,
our modern notions of the human self, agency, and experience have placed
upon usY
On the cusp between modernity and postmodernity, the task of
imagination is also to unmask the ~usions that would keep us from
acknowledging these inner possibilities. The postmodern has helped to
unmask a core illusion embedded in the modern story: that it is within the
reach of human power, and huma; power alone, be it through inwardness
plumbed and expressed, or through attunement with nature, or through
mastery over nature, to go beyond the conditions of our finitude. Yet, as
Taylor argues, much that goes by the name "postmodern" is itself caught
in the shadow of an illusion more subtle and far more dangerous, viz. that
our finitude is all there is (to this I would add: and it is all the same.) What
makes this illusion dangerous, on Taylor's account, is that it fatally
undermines the possibility of acknowledging the full significance of our
lives as human - an acknowledgment Taylor holds to be central to the selfinterpreting activity that is a key marker of our character as spirit.12 In the
absence of that which stands beyond life, there cannot be an affirmation of
life which is both sufficiently robust to acknowledge the plenitude of its
goodness and sufficiently sober to recognize humbly that life is neither all
that is nor all that matters. 13
What direction, then, might imagination take to enable a new
recognition of ourselves as spiritual, one that enables us to address the
leveling of meaning? Taylor suggests that it lies in the fashioning of "new
languages of personal resonance to make crucial human goods alive for us
again."14 Although he notes the association that this notion of "personal
resonance" has with the "expressive" strand of modernity, he distinguishes
it carefully from the radical subjectivism into which much of both
modernity and postmodernity have become fully enmeshed. The
distinction is needed so that "languages of personal resonance" can
effectively relate our human "life goods" to "constitutive goods" whose
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meaning and reality stand in being beyond the mere projection of
immanent human strivings. In this I believe that Taylor seeks to set
imagination off on the Augustinian path along which the movement
"inward" of the self is drawn into a movement "outward" and "upward"
and along which may be encountered the God who brings all such
movement into being.
This Augustinian echo suggests that the retrieval - or, indeed,
reconstruction - of our selves as spirit/spiritual may be possible only by
reference to what is encountered, recognized and respected as truly other
as we move in the space that our valuings create. This Augustinian
movement provides a theological context in which to read Taylor's
otherwise enigmatic descriptions of what it means to be a self: "We are
only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek
and find an orientation to the goOd."I5 On Taylor's account - in contrast to
what has become both a typically modern and postmodern account - our
activities of recognizing and bestowing significance and worth are not
confined to a space entirely of immanent human making.
On this account the most illusion-free ways of being a self - i.e. ways
of valuing and being valued, of interpreting and being interpreted - thus
involve recognition that value and meaning are not entirely ours to create.
r think it is legitimate to read Taylor's account here as an Augustinian and
Hegelian transformation of one of the most powerful postmodern
themes: recognition of the other as the space in which meanings emerge can
now also be seen as the space of spirit, i.e. the space in which otherness
can welcome and can receive welcome. Taylor's rendering of this theme
also has resonances of "grace," perhaps most clearly sounded in his
characterization of the hope needed to chart our course in the wake of
modernity, viz. the hope that is "a divine affirmation of the human, more
total than humans can ever attain unaided."I6
Taylor provides little explicit guidance for articulating what this hope
means for the project of retrieving a notion of "spirit" by which to
interpret our human lives and activities. The very suggestion of grace as
the horizon of his project could, r suspect, be easily dismissed as a mere
rhetorical flourish - but such a dismissal' would be typically modern, for
only moderns are likely to consider a rhetorical turn to be "mere." Both
premoderns and postmoderns (as Taylor seems well aware) know better
than to dismiss the rhetorical in this way. What direction, then, does
Taylor expect us to chart for imagination from this echo of grace? How
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does this horizon of grace as divine affirmation bear upon the possibility
of interpreting ourselves constitutively as spirit? At this point I can offer
only a suggestion that is as cryptic and as tentative as it is brief: spirit is the
presence of others welcomed; spirit is presence to others welcoming; spirit
is, first of all, being in the presence of the Other who welcomes all that is
other.
EPILOGUE: CHRISTIAN ETHICS, IMAGINATION, AND THE
RECOVERY OF THE HUMAN AS SPIRIT
If the diagnosis set forth in the main body of this chapter is correct, then
the articulation of a Christian ethic for the twenty-first century needs to
look critically and creatively at the resources available - both within
Christian belief and practice and within the emergent globalized culture that will enable the re-envisioning-nf spirit as a constitutive element of the
deepest part of our reality as human. The easier part of this task may be
locating the imaginative resources that lie within the traditions of
Christian belief and practice. One does not have to stand within the ambit
of Christian faith to recognize the power that the narratives within Hebrew
scripture, the parables of Jesus, or the lives of Francis of Assisi or Mother
Teresa have to remind us - sometimes uncomfortably - that what is most
deeply human within us (to use Taylor's image) is the "space" we clear (or
constrict) for recognizing and acting on the orientation to the good,
which, however flawed it may have become, remains firmly embedded
within us. When, for instance, we hear or read the story (2 Samuel
12:1-12) of how the prophet Nathan leads King David to recognize the
enormity of the betrayal involved in his adulterous taking of Bathsheba,
Uriah the Hittite's wife, a chord of self-recognition should strike in our
own hearts - we are just as capable of moral self-deception as King David
was and we are just as ready to condemn the other's conduct as we are to
excuse like conduct of our own - until we are confronted by the humbling
insight that we, too, are just as much the very "other" whom we were ready
to shun and condemn.
In this retrieval of the imaginative resources that lie within the
traditions of Christian belief and practice, Christian ethics must not
overlook the two-edged danger they also bear within them precisely in
their power to shape our self-understanding. As feminist, African, Latino,
African-American, and Asian theologians have vigorously, vividly, and
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variously reminded those carried along by the mainstream of European
and North American theology, uncritically appropriated images can
distort theology's understanding of God, humanity, and the world and
have misdirected - sometime disastrously - the practices of Christian
communities. At the same time, awareness of the power that these
resources have to disorient our movement toward what is good in the
space of our valuings should not cause us to shrink from the other edge of
their dangerous power. This is their capacity to surprise, subvert, and
overturn even the most settled understandings we may have of ourselves
and of the others we encounter in that space of our valuings. The story of
the Syro-Phoenician woman (Mark 7:24-29) hints at how the insistent
intrusion of the other - who turns inside out the image of "dog" that Jesus
meant to rebuke and repel her - could be dangerously subversive even for
Jesus in that it prods him to extend the horizon of his mission.
More challenging for Christian ethics - and, I believe, more urgent will be the work of discerning the resources within the rapidly shifting
kaleidoscope of the emerging globalized culture which will enable an
appropriate re-envisioning of "spirit" as a constitutive element of the
deepest part of our reality as human. To the extent that globalization is
driven solely by a dynamic of the greater production and distribution of
information, goods, and services to be consumed, the more likely we will
be tempted to shape ourselves solely in the image of homo consumens. As
one religious educator has noted, "Advertising, society's most potent
educational force, teaches [our children] that their hunger for intimacy,
security, success and meaning can be satisfied by conspicuous consumption.
But if the deepest human needs can be met by owning and consuming
products, what is left for religion to provide?"I7 Yet, if it is true, as I
claimed above, that the reality of spirit is so deeply embedded in the
human that it simply cannot be stifled, then even as we make ourselves
complicit in the attempted leveling of all meaning to the surface play of
contingencies, there remains something resistant within us that yearns for
heights and depths of meaning commensurate with the best aspirations of
our being.
Some of this work has already started. For instance, Tom Beaudoin, in
Virtual Faith: The Irreverent Spiritual Quest of Generation X,18 seeks to
discern how a popular, technologized, and globalized culture has shaped
authentic religious meanings for his "Generation X" cohort. Beaudoin's
work suggests that it will be increasingly important in the twenty-first
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century for Christian ethics to attend closely to the concrete and particular
ways in which contemporary culture - perhaps even without conscious
intent on the part of its makers - encourages or challenges individuals to
enlarge their horizons of meaning. So even as a dynamic of the leveling of
meaning plays itself out in contemporary culture, it may yet turn out to be
a graced occasion for rediscovery of the more enduring truth of the
resiliency of human spirit. 19
NOTES

1. This understanding of religion in terms of a human quest for meaning - or

in terms of what Paul Tillich termed "ultimate concern" - does not require
that the "final" meaning satisfying it be construed as that which is robustly
"transcendent" of human reality, e.g. the God of the Abrahamic religions.
It is thus an understanding o£ "religion" which is sweeping enough to
encompass views and movements (such as Marxism or scientific
naturalism) that even explicitly reject the doctrines and practices of those
religions - or indeed of any formally religious tradition - insofar as this
rejection is made in virtue of some alternative construal of what gives
human activity and existence its definitive significance.
2. The universality of such a quest for what I call "final meaning" has been
recently affirmed in John Paul II's encyclical letter Fides et Ratio as a
common basis out of which humanity's philosophical and religious
dynamisms issue. To that extent, I believe that the encyclical continues
primarily to engage philosophy in its "modern" guise. It does not fully
articulate the radical challenge posed by the forms of postmodernity which
theoretically or practically set aside the presuppositions that human beings
(1) necessarily find themselves engaged in such a quest and (2) must
eventually attain such final meaning to find life satisfaction.
3. A point made - probably without conscious irony - in a recent television
ad for an on-line securities trading service which is set in a meditation
class: mantra-chanting students are asked to visualize themselves in
soothing and tranquil circumstances. After one student evokes a seaside
scene and another the forest, the third imagines himself at his computer
making eight-dollar-per-trade transactions - a scene that immediately
captures the imagination of the whole class, and the instructor as well, as
truly relaxing.
4. Meaning as coding can also be seen at work in the hopes that have been
pinned on the successful completion of projects to map the human
genome: knowledge of the code oflife will provide mastery to determine its
future shape. The role of economic incentives in this project, moreover, is
hardly peripheral: the U.S. Patent Office has been accepting applications
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that would give to those who have deciphered segments of the genome
rights over future use of those segments - for instance, in the case that they
later provide a basis for new and effective medical therapies.
5. Charles Taylor gives his magisterial work, Sources of the Self, the subtitle
The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
6. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 317.
7. Ibid., p. 520.
8. These forms of "reflective appropriation of experience" are Catholic
theology's understanding of grace as the freely given completion of all
creation, Ignatius of Loyola's principle of "finding God in all things," and
Immanuel Kant's recognition of hope as the critically founded focus for
humanity's common moral endeavors.
9. This point is more extensively treated in Philip J. Rossi, S.]., "Imagination
and the Truth of Morality;' in Together Toward Hope: A Journey to Moral
Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 37-80.
10. Iris Murdoch is one author who has extensively explored - both in her
novels and in her philosophical essays - the power of imagination to bring
us to make real that which is good. For a thoughtful appreciation of her
work, see Charles Taylor, "Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy;' in Iris
Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, ed. Maria Antonaccio and
William Schweiker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 3-28.
11. For Taylor's elaboration of this point, see Part IV of his Marianist Award
Lecture, A Catholic Modernity?, ed. James 1. Heft (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), pp. 30-37.
12. Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 341-343.
13. I take this to be much ofthe burden of Taylor's argument in Part III of "Iris
Murdoch and Moral Philosophy;' pp. 18-28.
14. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 513.
15. Ibid., p. 34. Cf. Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 3: "[TJo be a full
human agent, to be a person or self in the ordinary meaning, is to exist in a
space defined by distinctions of worth. A self is a being for whom certain
questions of categoric value have arisen, and received at least partial
answers."
16. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 522.
17. James DiGiacomo, "Theology for Teens;' America, 182(3),2000, p. 13.
18. Tom Beaudoin, Virtual Faith: The Irreverent Spiritual Quest of Generation X
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998). For an application of Beaudoin's
insights to a specific religious context, see Jeremy W. Langford,
"Ministering to Gen-X Catholics, Jesus Style," America, 182(14), 2000,
pp. 6-10.
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19. The initial draft of this chapter was written under the auspices of a
fellowship at the Institute of Advanced Studies in the Humanities,
University of Edinburgh.

